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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No.: 20061080 - CA
vs.
KARL OTTERSON,
Defendant/Appellant,

Comes now, the Defendant/Appellant, KARL OTTERSON, by and through his
attorney of record, DANA M. FACEMYER, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure Rule 24(c), provides this Reply to the Brief of the Appellee.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED CREDIBILITY
TESTIMONY REGARDING ONE OF THE STATES MAIN WITNESSES.
In the Appellee's Brief, the State argues that the trial court was not in error for

excluding the credibility testimony of Richard Cummings, one of the State's main
witnesses, for two reasons; 1] Defendant waived his claim relating to the trial court's
motion regarding Cummings testimony, and 2] The trial court did not abuse it's
discretion by limiting Cummings' proposed testimony. See Aplee. Br. at 21, and 25.
A.

The Defendant's right to challenge this holding was properly preserved
for appeal

Appellee argues that the Defendant waived his right to challenge the trial court's
"in limine" motion regarding Cummings proposed testimony by not calling Cummings to
testify at trial. See Aplee. Br. at 21. Such reasoning should be rejected because 1] case
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law cited to by the appellee refers exclusively to the testimony of the actual defendant,
and 2] the motion regarding Cummings testimony was not made "in limine"
a. Case law cited by the Appellee refers exclusively to the testimony of an
actual Defendant
The rule, that a defendant must testify at trial in order to preserve the right to
appeal a motion limiting that defendant's testimony, refers exclusively to the testimony
of an actual defendant. The Appellee concedes that the three primary cases used to
establish their argument "all dealt with defendants who did not testify." See Aplee Br. at
pg. 23 (referring to Luce, Gentry, and Kirb\>ood). As the Appellee has conceded this
point, a more in-depth argument will not be attempted in this reply. The only source cited
to by the Appellee to support the reasoning that this rule should apply to "a proposed
witness who does not testify" [United States v. Coumaris, 399 F.3d 343, 348 (D.C. Cir.
2005)] is easily distinguishable. See Aplee. Br. at 23.
In Coumaris, the trial court granted the government's "in limine" motion to crossexamine one of the defendant's proposed witnesses in an attempt to impeach that
witness. Id. at 347-8. At some point during trial, counsel for the defense conceded that
"'probably the character witnesses have already been scratched based upon' the court's
initial [and unrelated] ruling" and the defendant himself "represented to the district court
that he likely would not call [this] witnesses irrespective of the court's subsequent
decision" to grant the government's "in limine" motion. This proposed witness did not
take the stand at trial and the defense appealed the trial court's decision regarding the in
limine motion.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit court ruled that the defendant "waived his objection
to the district court's in limine ruling by failing to call the character witnesses to testify."
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Id. at 348-9. Coumaris involved a very questionable witness who didn't take the stand
because, as defense counsel conceded, the witness himself was likely to be impeached.
The defense also admitted that regardless of the Court's decision, it was unlikely that the
witness would have been called to the stand anyways. Coumaris dealt with a witness and
his likely impeachment, who didn't take the stand for that reason. It was for this reason
that "any prejudice to [the defendant] as a result of the court's decision to allow crossexamination on those topics is 'wholly speculative,' since [the court] 'cannot assume that
the adverse ruling motivated [the] decision not to' call the witnesses". Id. at 349 (citing
Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42).
In the case at bar, the proposed testimony of Mr. Cummings would have played a
key role in the defendant's case by impeaching the state's key witness. In contrast to
Coumaris, the trial court's adverse ruling directly '"motivated [the] decision not to' call
the witnessf]." Id. at 349 (citing Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42). Cummings' limited testimony
as imposed by the court made his testimony practically useless and his taking the stand
would have been a waste of time and contrary to the principles of judicial efficiency.
Cummings' testimony would have "clearly cast doubt not only on Mr. Hill's testimony
(the state's main witness). . . but would have created serious questions as to the bulk of
the state's evidence." See Aplt. Br. at 14. For these reasons, Coumaris and the case at bar
are easily and clearly distinguishable, and the State's reasoning on this subject should be
disregarded.
b. The motion regarding Cummings testimony was not made "in limine'*
Even if the Court finds that this before-mentioned rule extends to proposed
witnesses, all of the cases cited to by the appellee refer to in limine motions. Appellee
argues that the ruling made by the trial court regarding Cummings* proposed testimony
-3-

should qualify as a motion in limine and therefore meets the requirements of the rule. As
this rule refers exclusively to in limine motions and the case-at-bar does not involve such
motions, this rule should not be applied in this case.
A "motion in limine" is "[a] pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence
not be referred to or offered at trial." Black's Law Dictionary, Motion in Limine (8th ed.
2004). Clearly an in limine motion occurs pre-trial and is in response to a request that
certain evidence not be mentioned or used at trial. This issue was raised near the end of
the prosecution's case, within a day of when the defense had planned to call Mr.
Cummings to the stand. The defendant did not ask "the court to set parameters on
Cummings' proposed testimony" as claimed by the state, but rather had Cummings
proposed testimony limited by the judge during a break in the prosecution's case. See
Aplee. Br. at 24. A motion in limine must be a "request" and because the state concedes
that the "defendant raised the issue," and the defendant would never request that his own
witness's testimony be limited, it becomes evident that this issue was not an in limine
motion as argued by the defendant. Id. at 24.
For these abovementioned reasons, this court should find that the ruling on this
issue does not qualify as an in limine motion.
B.

Defendant did not waive his right to appeal the trial court's in limine
ruling because the ruling so limited the scope of the witnesses testimony
as to practically render his testimony useless at trial

The appellee argues that the defense did not preserve the right to appeal the trial
court's decision regarding Cummings testimony because Cummings was not called to the
stand. See Aplee. Br. at 21. The Appellee reasoning follows that of Luce v. United States,
469 U.S. 38 (1984), which is flawed (as already mentioned) as the case refers to a
defendant who does not testify.
-4-

The citation to Luce that 'the court must know the precise nature of the
defendant's testimony, which is unknowable when, as here, the defendant does not
testify'* has been used inappropriately by the Appellee. See Aplee. Br. at 22. There is an
obvious difference between the limiting of an actual defendant's testimony and
speculating the prejudice and impact of that ruling at trial, and the limiting of
Cummings' testimony in this case and judging the impact of that ruling at trial,
especially when considering the limitation placed on Cummings testimony and that the
record plainly states what Cummings* testimony would have been.
The transcript clearly shows that Cummings was a "primary witness/* that the
foundation was properly laid for Cummings* testimony, and it also outlines Cummings'
proposed testimony. Transcript, October 4, 2006 a.m., 7-9. The court did know of the
'"precise nature'* of the witness's testimony and so limited his testimony to render taking
the stand practically useless. Because Cummings limited testimony was no longer useful,
and for the sake of preserving judicial efficiency, the Defense did not call Cummings to
the stand. See Aplnt. Br. at 10. The record shows that the Defense planned to have
Cummings take the stand, yet due to the Court's order which rendered Cummings
testimony '"small** and "short'* in reference to its likely impact on the jury, and time
constraints, it was decided to not have Cummings take the stand. R. 148:14-23.
As Cumming's testimony was allowable under U.R.E. Rule 404(b), this decision
should be reviewed by a Utah Appellate Court uunder an abuse of discretion standard.*'
State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, \ 21 (quoting State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT
59, f 16). Cummings proposed testimony was relevant as it would have gone directly to
showing the motivations, preparations and plans of the state's primary witness, Mr. Hill,
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"clearly cast[ing] doubt not only on Mr. Hill's testimony. . . but would have created
serious questions as to the bulk of the state's evidence." See Aplt. Br. at 14. The court
abused its discretion by limiting a testimony which should have been allowed by Rule
404(b). For all these aforementioned reasons, the Appellate Court should find that the
trial court abused it's discretion by limiting Cummings' testimony.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING THE
CONFESSION LETTER WRITTEN BY THE DEFENDANT
In the Appellee's Brief the State argues that the trial court did not abuse it's

discretion by excluding the confession letter for three reasons: A) uthe trial court did not
abuse it's discretion in determining relevance, B) even if the trial court abused it's
discretion, the error was cured by allowing reference to the letter, and C) the error was
harmless." See Aplee. Br. at 28, 29, 30 and 31. The Appellee's argument is flawed for
three reasons: A) the Confession Letter directly correlates with the defendant's motive,
B) allowing reference to the letter throughout trial does not cure the error of it's
exclusion, and C) this abuse of discretion was not harmless as the confession letter was
relevant to both contradict the alleged motive and theory put forth by the State.
A.

The Confession Letter directly correlates with the defendant's motive

The Appellee argues that the trial court did not error in finding the Confession
Letter irrelevant. See Aplee. Br. at 29. Although it is true that trial courts "have wide
discretion in determining relevance, probative value, and prejudice" [State v. Valdez,
2006 UT App 290, f7, 141 P.3d 614] abuse of that discretion is reviewable by the
appellate courts. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, f21.
That discretion is abused as soon as the trial court begins to "dictate the
appropriate strategy for the trial attorney to pursue in a nay given situation." State v.
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Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court has established that
counsel must have "wide latitude to make tactical decisions" and that courts should "not
question such decisions unless [they] find 4no reasonable basis' for them." State v
Powell 2007 UT 9,1)46 (Utah 2007) (quoting Taylor v Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282
(Utah 1995)).
In the case-at-bar, there was a very "reasonable basis" behind the "tactical
decision" to introduce the Confession Letter into evidence. The state's theory of the
alleged motivation for the solicitation relied on the defendant's reaction to the way the
prosecutor handled the defendant's previous sex abuse cases. The Confession Letter
directly relates to this alleged motive as it portrays the defendant's desire to take
responsibility for those previous crimes.
The Confession Letter is extremely relevant to this case as motive is a key
element in the charge for solicitation of murder. See UC.A § 76-4-203(1) ("An actor
commits criminal solicitation if with intent that a felony be committed . . .") and UCA §
76-4-203(2) ("An actor may be convicted under this section only //the solicitation is
made under circumstances strongly corroborative of the actor's intent that the offense be
committed.")(emphasis added.) Yet the trial court ruled that the letter "had no beaiing
on what the jury has to decide as to the elements of the charge" R. 131:57. The trial court
took it upon itself to make this "tactical decision," especially when considering the fact
that the prosecution did not even object to the introduction of the letter into evidence. For
these reasons the appellate court should find the trial court abused its discretion in not
allowing the Confession Letter to be introduced into evidence.
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B.

Allowing reference to the letter throughout trial does not cure the error of
it's exclusion.

The Appellee contends that even if the court erred by excluding the confession
letter, the error was cured by allowing reference to the letter during trial. See Aplee. Br.
at 30. As there exists a substantial difference between knowing thait a confession letter
exists and holding a confession letter in one's hands and being able to read it oneself, in
no way was the error cured.
The facts of the case cited to by the Appellee [State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^29,
994 P.2d 177] are considerably different from the case-at-bar. In Colwell, the trial court
refused to allow a witness to answer a question which would have supported the
defense's theory for the case. However, later during the court proceeding, the defense
was allowed to present their theory through other means, by the combined testimony of
others. The court explained that "[w]here evidence is excluded by the trial court and the
substance of such evidence is later admitted through some other means, any error which
may have resulted is cured." Id. at 183. The term "substance" in this context reveals that
the "evidence [] later admitted through some other means" must be nearly as reliable in
quality and quantity to the original evidence which was not previously allowed by the
court.
Allowing reference to the Confession Letter does not begin to come close to
providing the same quality of evidence that presenting an actual copy of the letter to the
jurors to hold and read would have provided. The trial court's abuse of discretion in this
case regarding the Confession Letter could not be cured without allowing the letter to be
introduced into evidence. The letter went directly to the defendant's motive, was
extremely relevant and probative and the prosecution did not object to the letters
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introduction into evidence. The trial court clearly abused its discretion and the error was
not cured at trial.
C.

The abuse of discretion was not harmless as the confession letter was
relevant to both contradict the alleged motive and theory put forth by the
State.

The Appellee argues if it is found that the trial court abused its discretion, that
such error was harmless. See Aplee. Br. at 31. Error is harmful "[i]f it is reasonably
likely a different outcome would result with the introduction of evidence and confidence
in the verdict is undermined ...'" Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^26.
It is reasonably likely that there would have been a different outcome if the
Confession Letter were allowed to be introduced into evidence. The letter clearly
contradicted the state's theory for the defendant's motive and would have cast the
defendant in a much better light. The defendant not only desired to take full
responsibility for his previous crimes, but he wrote a Confession Letter which contained
confessions for acts which he had not, and would likely never had been charged with.
The jury deserved the right to receive such relevant information in it's entirety, and the
defendant had the right to have such information known by those who were judging his
guilt.
The most influential evidence provided by the state, the testimony of Mr. Hill,
would have been greatly rebutted by Cummings testimony if it were not for the trial
courts abuse of discretion in that situation which significantly limited Cummings'
testimony to the point of relatively no worth. With the introduction of both the
Confession Letter and Cummings' proposed testimony into evidence, it is highly likely
that there would have been a different verdict at trial.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY
TESTIFIED TO "CORRECT" THE RECORD ABOBUT A PREVIOUS
HEARING OVER WHICH HE HAD PRESIDED
The Appellee contends that this claim should not be reviewed under the invited

error doctrine because the defendant "invited" the Judge to make the comments which
are being challenged. See Aplee. Br. at 32. The Appellee does not contest the fact that the
judge's actions were blatantly inappropriate by improperly testifying as a "witness"
during the trial. Appellee's contention is flawed in that A) the judge made several
inappropriate comments before the supposed "invited error" occurred, and B) the judge's
testimony went well beyond any "invitation" from defense counsel.
In the case-at-bar, the defendant made a few inaccurate statements while
testifying regarding a previous court hearing which the trial court judge happened to
preside. The trial court judge proceeded to interrupt the normal course of the trial to add
new evidence unknown to both the defense and the prosecution. The judge in essence
testified of personal knowledge based on recollection which directly contradicted the
defendant's testimony. R. 131: 72-158 As stated by the prosecution, "[ajfter providing
counsel with the file [of the previous court hearing] during a recess, Judge Stott asked
counsel how they wished to handle the matter." See Aplee. Br. at 33. At this point,
defense counsel agreed to have the judge reiterate his understanding of the file to the
jury.
The invited error doctrine reasons that when "counsel.. . affirmatively
represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the [motion or proceeding]"
then counsel can not appeal that motion or proceeding as he or she invited that alleged
error. For the invited error doctrine to be applicable, it must be found that the defendant
invited an error before any error was present.
- 10-

A.

The judge made several inappropriate comments before the supposed
"invited error*' occurred.

In this case, the judge interrupted the normal proceedings to share testimony
which contradicted the testimony just rendered by the defendant. The defense did not
invite the judge to do this. It is the prosecution's responsibility to discover such
discrepancies during cross-examination. Judges decide questions of law; not
discrepancies of fact. The judge was in error as soon as he interrupted the normal trial
court proceeding to introduce new evidence into trial. The judge continued in error by
providing the file of the previous court hearing until the time that he asked counsel how
they wanted the matter handled. Even if it is found that the defendant invited the error of
the judge's comments after the judge asked counsel how they wanted the matter handled,
the court/judge had been in error for a significant amount of time beforehand.
This court should find that the trial court erred as the judge inappropriately
stepped away from his role as a judge at a much earlier time before the conversation
which resulted in the alleged "invited error," The trial court should have never
interrupted the normal proceedings to provide personal information or the file and the
judge's question regarding the handling of the matter should have never been voiced.
B.

The judge's testimony went well beyond any "invitation" from defense
counsel.

This Court should find that the judge's testimony at trial was not invited because
any "invitation'' from defense counsel did not include allowing the judge to argue that
the defendant had lied in his previous testimony.
At trial the judge interrupted proceedings to introduce evidence gained through
personal experience. The judge informed counsel that according to a "responsibility of
this court to rectify the problem, to see that the jury is not left with the testimony that's
- 11 -

been given that is incorrect," that something needed to be done about the Defendant's
testimony. See Transcript, October 4, 2006 p.m. at 154. The judge informed counsel
that something was going to be done, he did not ask them if something should be done,
or provide them with the information to use as they chose, but instead he informed them
that something would be done.
Trial counsel does not have the freedom to critique and object to decisions of the
court with the liberty with which they would object to the actions of opposing counsel.
A trial judge is the ultimate authority within his or her courtroom and can only be
corrected as to mistakes by Courts of higher authority. The legislature of this state
recognized the practical realities of objecting to the decisions of trial judges when they
stated that "no objection need be made in order to preserve the point." U.R E. Rule 605.
In this case the judge had made a decision and merely gave counsel a few options
on how to carry that decision out. Defense counsel, far from inviting the judge to testify,
simply requested that the judge "reiterate the court's understanding of the file." See
Transcript, October 4, 2006 p.m. at 154.
The judge did not provide a reiteration of the file, but instead went on to testify as
to his own actions and personal knowledge of the previous events casting the defendant
as a liar. The judge stated, "What actually happened was not as Mr. Otterson had
testified," and concluded his comments with, "You've now been advised with respect to
the information that is accurate concerning the incident that happened on that hearing."
Id. at 157-158.
Because the judge informed the parties that the court was going to "rectify the
problem" before any "invitation" occurred, and because the judge's testimony went
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beyond any "invitation" that was made, this Court should find that the practical realities
of the courtroom dynamics resulted in the judge testifying without invitation.
IV.

THE TOTALITY OF THE ERRORS BY THE TRIAL COURT SERVED TO
CUMULATIVELY BIAS THE JURY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
Finally, the state argues that the court should reject the cumulative error claim for

three reasons: A) the trial court did not commit manifest injustice when it prevented
defendant's counsel from addressing an objection to a jury instruction to the jury, B) the
trial court did not commit plain error when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor
from referring to a defendant as a liar, and C) even if the court did commit errors, this
Court should not reverse under the cumulative error doctrine. See Aplee. Br. at 34, 37,
and 41. This argument should be rejected because: A) the Trial Court erred by preventing
the defense counsel from addressing an objection to a jury instruction given to the jury,
B) The Trial Court erred when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor from
referring to defendant as a "liar," and C) the cumulative error doctrine should be applied
as the totality of the errors by the trial court served to significantly prejudice the jury
against the defendant.
A.

The trial court erred by preventing the defense counsel from addressing an
objection to a jury instruction given to the jury

The state contends that the trial court was not in error when it made corrections to
defendant's statements regarding one of the Jury Instructions because the defendant
"objected" to the instructions in front of the jury without first objecting the instructions
before the judge. See Aplee. Br. at 34, 35, and 36. Defense concedes that it is improper to
object to any jury instructions to the jury, especially without first making such objections
known to the judge; yet the defendant did not "object" to the jury instructions at all as
contended by the state.
-13-

In an attempt to clarify the definition of "reasonable doubt'* to the jury, the
defendant stated in closing arguments that "there are very few things in the world that we
know with absolute certainty" and followed with the example that "I know that I am
wearing a watch, but they put it in." The judge took exception to these statements and
stated that "the comments were inappropriate" after the defense had finished with their
closing arguments.
Closing arguments are the last impression the jury receives before deliberations
and therefore are highly influential; any actions influencing that last impression carries
the risk of being highly prejudicial. The trial court judge made these seemingly
unnecessary comments at the substantial risk of causing prejudice to the jury. This court
should find under plain error review that the trial court erred because "an error exists; the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and the error is harmful. .." Pratt v.
i\fe/5ow,2007UT4lat1f 16.
B.

The trial court erred when it failed to sua sponte prevent the prosecutor
from referring to defendant as a "liar".

The Appellee asserts that the state's reference to the defendant as a "liar" was not
inappropriate because the remark did not "call to the attention of the jury a matter it
would not be justified in considering in determining the verdict;" {Stale v. Johnson. 2007
UT App. 184 ^f 42, 163 P.3d 695 (internal quotations, citation, and alterations omitted) or
in other words, the reference to the defendant as a "liar" was not improper because it was
true and accurate.
As mentioned in the appellant's brief, the statement that the defendant is a "liar"
is inappropriate as the statement either inaccurately characterized the court's previous
statements or improperly reiterates previous improper statements by the court. See Aplnt.
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Br. at 24. Utah Courts have decided that it is improper to refer to a defendant as a ''liar.'"
{State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184).
Because it is the jury's responsibility to decide whether an individual lied or not,
and which testimony from the defendant to believe or to disregard, the state should not
and is not allowed to refer to a defendant as a "liar." The state's remarks 4,call[ed] to the
attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining the
verdict." Johnson, 163 P.3d 695. The "proof * that the defendant is a liar as listed by the
state in their brief, consists of highly contested and disputed evidence which should be
left to the jury to decide. By labeling the defendant as a "liar" the state undermined
confidence in the jury's verdict.
C.

The cumulative error doctrine should be applied as the totality of the
errors by the trial court served to significantly prejudice the jury against
the defendant.

Appellee argues that the cumulative error doctrine should not be applied because
the "trial court did not commit errors in any of the charged issues [and] . .. the evidence
supporting the defendant's conviction was overwhelming." See Aplee. Br. at 41 and 42.
Through sound reasoning, the appellant has established that the trial court erred
by commenting on the defendant's testimony and the defense's closing argument, by
testifying to and arguing that defendant was a liar, and by failing to limit the state's
interpretation of the court's comments during their closing. Even if it is found that one of
these errors does not reach the necessary standard of harm to overturn a trial court
decision, the cumulative effect of these errors portrays the serious possibility that the
judge preferred the state's case due to distrust in the defendant's credibility. The
combination of these errors resulted in a real and substantial disadvantage for the
defendant and "there is a reasonable likelihood that. . . there would have been a more
-15-

favorable result" for the defendant. State ex relAMD.,

2006 UT App 457, If 28 n.6, 153

p.3d 724 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
CONCLUSION
The Court should find that the trial court committed several significant and
serious errors which resulted in a substantially unjust trial for the defendant. For the
abovementioned reasons and foregoing analysis, this Court should order a new trial for
the defendant.
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